We compare labor market outcomes under …rm-level and sector-level bargaining in a one-sector Mortensen-Pissarides economy with …rm-speci…c productivity shocks. Our main theoretical results are twofold. First, unemployment is lower under …rm-level bargaining, due both to a lower job destruction rate and a higher job-…nding rate. Key to this result is the interplay between wage compression under sector-level bargaining and …rm heterogeneity. Second, introducing e¢ cient opting-out of sector-level agreements su¢ ces to bring unemployment down to its level under decentralized bargaining.
Introduction
In most of continental Europe, wage bargaining takes place predominantly in the form of collective bargaining. The proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements typically exceeds by far union membership, and in some cases coverage is almost universal. Among European countries, however, there are noticeable di¤erences in the levels at which wage bargaining takes place (national, regional, sector, …rm), the way in which collective bargaining agreements overlap, the unions and employers which are entitled to bargain, and the extension rules by which the agreements may be applied to workers and …rms outside their scope. 1 The idea that the characteristics of collective bargaining systems may in ‡uence unemployment has received a lot of attention, at least since the 1980s, with many empirical studies trying to assign cross-country di¤erences in unemployment to some of these characteristics. 2 Possibly the most in ‡uential argument to relate collective bargaining and unemployment was the "hump-shape"relationship between centralization of collective bargaining and real wages, proposed by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) . The basis for this relationship is well-known: when collective bargaining takes place at …rms facing competitive markets, there are not monopolistic rents to be shared among the wage-setters and real wages remain in line with productivity; when it takes place at the national level, wage-setters take into account "broader interests" and internalize the external e¤ects of wage increases, such as, for instance, those on in ‡ation, unemployment, and taxes needed to …nance unemployment bene…ts. However, when collective bargaining takes place at an intermediate level (say, sectorial or regional) wages are not restrained by neither competition nor "corporatism", and, hence, unemployment is higher. This argument was extended to take into account other external e¤ects of wage increases and to put it in the context of an open economy (Calmfors, 1993; Danthine and Hunt, 1994) , with the conclusion that the hump shape hypothesis remains valid, although the unemployment consequences of the centralization of collective bargaining are less pronounced. Partly because of this, partly because of the di¢ culties to measure concepts like the "centralization" and the "coordination" of collective bargaining, the empirical literature has not found categorical evidence that cross-country di¤erences in unemployment are related to cross-country di¤erences in collective bargaining systems (OECD, 1997; Flanagan, 1999) .
A striking feature in existing theoretical models on the macroeconomic e¤ects of collective bargaining is the common assumption of symmetry across all …rms in the economy, which di¤er only in the particular sector they belong to. To the extent that …rms are a¤ected both by …rm-speci…c and sector-speci…c factors, analyses of the e¤ects of collective bargaining that abstract 1 from such heterogeneity may miss an important part of the overall picture. 3 Furthermore, once we take heterogeneity into account, the question immediately arises as to how sensitive relative wages are to …rm-speci…c and sector-speci…c factors. In this regard, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that centralization of wage bargaining tends to compress relative wages. 4 Hence, if collective bargaining takes place at the …rm level it is more likely that wages react to …rm-speci…c factors, such as productivity, than if collective bargaining takes place at the sector level and higher. A priori, the unemployment consequences of wage compression under …rm heterogeneity are ambiguous. On the one hand, centralized collective bargaining may increase job destruction, as relative wages do not adjust su¢ ciently to negative …rm-speci…c or sector-speci…c productivity shocks. On the other hand, wage compression may increase job creation, because wages do not incorporate positive …rm-speci…c or sector-speci…c productivity shocks and therefore pro…ts are higher for high productivity jobs. 5 Using a search and matching model similar to ours, Boeri and Burda (2009) show that, when there are …ring costs, collective bargaining may arise endogenously as a choice of employers and workers and that endogenous adjustment of the coverage of collectively negotiated wages may alter the employment consequences of labor market reforms. Rather than focusing on the conditions under which collective bargaining may arise as a the rational choice of employers and workers, this paper addresses the question as to how the structure of collective bargaining a¤ects labor market performance in the presence of …rm heterogeneity. In order to provide a modern treatment of this issue, we base our analysis on the search-and-matching labor market framework developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , where unemployment is the result of endogenous gross job creation and gross job destruction ‡ows. In particular, we introduce collective bargaining in a one-sector Mortensen-Pissarides economy where …rms di¤er in their productivity levels. 6 We consider two alternative collective bargaining regimes: …rm-level and sector-level bargaining. Motivated by the existing evidence on wage compression under centralized collective bargaining, we assume that under sector-level bargaining a common wage is chosen for all …rms in the sector. In both cases, we assume Nash wage bargaining and model credible threats along the lines of Hall and Milgrom (2008) , where fallback positions are determined by the possibility of rejecting o¤ers and making countero¤ers. In this framework, wages respond to …rm-speci…c productivity under …rm-level bargaining, whereas they respond to sector-wide average productivity under sector-level bargaining. In each bargaining scenario, those jobs that fall below 3 The need to consider …rm-speci…c and sector-speci…c factors when studying the macroeconomic e¤ects of collective bargaining was acknowledged already in Calmfors and Dri¢ ll's seminal work (see Calmfors and Dri¢ ll, 1988, p. 46) . 4 See Kahn (2000) , Blau and Kahn (1996) and Flanagan (1999) . 5 See Bertola and Rogerson (1997) 6 Unlike Boeri and Burda (2009), we abstract from di¤erent workers'observable skills. a certain productivity threshold will be destroyed; absent hiring and …ring costs, new jobs are created above the same productivity threshold. The latter threshold depends on how wages are determined, and therefore di¤ers across collective bargaining regimes. Admittedly, there are good reasons to believe that wage setters may have di¤erent objective functions depending on the level at which bargaining takes place. For instance, it has been argued that centralized wage bargaining can internalize several externalities associated with wage-setting, while, in contrast, more decentralized wage bargaining leads to higher wage pressure because of "leapfrogging", that is, the inclusion of relative wages into the workers'objective function. 7 Moreover, from the employers'perspective, sectorial collective bargaining agreements can be perceived as instruments to "regulate" competition by imposing similar wages across all …rms. While these considerations are relevant to the comparison of outcomes between sectorial and …rm-level collective bargaining, they have been widely discussed in the theoretical literature, and, empirically, they are rather "fussy" to be approached quantitatively. Hence, in this paper we want to isolate the e¤ect of sectorial collective bargaining on job creation, job destruction, and unemployment exclusively through wage compression. Our main theoretical results are twofold. First, unemployment is higher under sector-level bargaining than under …rm-level bargaining. The reason is the following. On the one hand, under sector-level bargaining the job destruction threshold is higher than it is under …rm-level bargaining; therefore, low productivity jobs that would survive (or would be created) in the latter regime are destroyed (or are not created) in the former. On the other hand, under sector-level bargaining the anticipation of lower or no pro…ts for low-productivity jobs discourages vacancy posting relative to …rm-level bargaining. Both the higher separation rate and the lower job-…nding rate translate into higher unemployment.
Our sector-level bargaining scenario can be interpreted as a situation in which …rm-level agreements that lower the standards of higher level agreements are not possible, due for instance to legal constraints. We thus consider an alternative scenario in which those …rms and workers that mutually agree to opt out of sector-level agreements can do so. The latter scenario, which we refer to as e¢ cient opting-out, leads us to our second main result. We show that allowing for e¢ cient opting-out is enough to bring unemployment down to its level under decentralized bargaining. This holds despite the fact that only a minority of …rms (those which cannot a¤ord to pay the wage agreed at the sector level) e¤ectively opt out. The reason is the following. The productivity threshold for opting-out …rms is lower than for non-opting-out …rms, and therefore represents the relevant job creation and job destruction threshold in this scenario. We …nd that the latter thresh- 7 See Calmfors (1993). old is exactly the same as in the …rm-level bargaining scenario. As a result, the two transition rates and unemployment will be the same too.
Finally, we assess numerically the magnitude of the theoretical e¤ects just described by calibrating our model to an archetypical continental European economy. We …nd that moving from sector-level to …rm-level bargaining (or to e¢ cient opting-out) reduces the unemployment rate by about 5 percentage points. We also perform sensitivity analysis with respect both to parameter values and to the structure of sector-level bargaining. We …nd that a reasonable range for the unemployment gap between sector-level and …rm-level bargaining is 1 to 5 percentage points.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium in each bargaining regime, as well as in the e¢ cient opting out scenario, obtaining along the way a number of theoretical results. Section 4 provides a numerical application of our framework to an average continental European economy. In Section 5 we consider an alternative form of sector-level bargaining and compare it numerically to the other bargaining scenarios. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
Model
We now present a model of a one-sector Mortensen-Pissarides economy where …rms di¤er in their idiosyncratic productivity levels. There is one job in each …rm, occupied by a single worker. Time is discrete. We focus on steady state equilibria throughout the paper.
Matching technology
Labor market frictions are summarized by a matching function, m (u; v), where u is the number of unemployed and v is the number of vacancies. The matching function is strictly increasing in each argument. We normalize the size of the labor force to one, such that u also represents the unemployment rate. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the matching probability for vacancies is given by m (u; v) =v = m ((v=u) 1 ; 1) q (v=u), with q strictly decreasing in the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, v=u , also known as labor market tightness. Similarly, the matching probability for unemployed workers is m (u; v) =u = m (1; v=u) = q ( ), which is strictly increasing in labor market tightness.
Firm and worker value functions
An active job produces z units of output, where z di¤ers across …rms. The process z is iid both over time and across …rms, and has cumulative distribution function F (z). Let b = s; f denote the bargaining regime, where s denotes …rm-level bargaining and f denotes sector-level bargaining. Each period, those jobs that fall below a certain reservation productivity R b become unpro…table for the …rm and are thus destroyed. The value for the …rm of a job with idiosyncratic productivity z in bargaining regime b is given by
where w b (z) is the wage (which may depend on the job's productivity), r is the real interest rate and is an exogenous separation rate. The value of the same job for the worker is given by
where U b is the value of unemployment. The latter is given by
where is the ‡ow payo¤ of being unemployed.
Wage bargaining
We consider two alternative bargaining scenarios. In the …rm-level bargaining scenario, each …rm-worker pair bargains individually. In the sector-level bargaining scenario, a sector union and a sector federation of employers bargain over the wages to be paid in the sector. For both bargaining regimes, we assume credible threats as in Hall and Milgrom (2008) . As argued by these authors, employment relationships generate a joint surplus that glues the negotiating parties together. As a result, unions do not seriously consider permanent resignation of workers as an alternative to reaching an agreement, and …rms do not consider discharging the workers permanently either. In other words, neither party can credibly commit to dissolving the match and walking away in the absence of agreement, as is typically assumed in the search and matching literature. Instead, each party's credible threat point is to reject the other party's o¤er and continue negotiating in the following period. Whereas this line of reasoning is generally appealing, we …nd it particularly plausible when collective bargaining takes place at the sector level. In both cases, we assume Nash wage bargaining. We …rst describe the case of …rm-level bargaining.
Firm-level bargaining
In each period, …rm and worker negotiate over the wage to be paid in that period. If no agreement is reached, then no production takes place during the current period. The …rm incurs a cost , and the worker enjoys the payo¤ . Both parties take up the negotiation again at the beginning of the following period. We de…ne the disagreement values for the …rm and the worker,
Therefore, the worker is paid the average of her product, z, and the sum of the disagreement payo¤ and the disagreement cost . Equation (6) implies that the worker's surplus, w f (z) , is one half of the joint match surplus, z ( ).
Sector-level bargaining
In the sector-level bargaining scenario, a sector-wide employer federation bargains with a sectorwide union over the wages to be paid in the sector. Based on empirical evidence on wage compression under centralized collective bargaining, we assume that both parties choose a common wage for all …rms in the sector, w s (z) = w s . The employer federation and the union care about the aggregate surplus of those …rms and workers, respectively, that will be covered by the wage agreement. Such aggregate payo¤s are given by the number of …rm-worker pairs that are left once the wage agreement comes into e¤ect, n s , times their respective average payo¤. As before, we assume that in the absence of agreement no production takes place. Each …rm and each worker in the sector receives the payo¤ and , respectively, and sector-level representatives resume negotiations in the following period. The individual disagreement values are given by equations (4) and (5), with the superscript s replacing f . Again,J s andW s U s must both be positive in order for each …rm and worker to be willing to wait for the sector-level negotiators to reach an agreement in the following period. Using equations (1) and (2) for b = s, the surplus of each …rm and worker relative to the disagreement values is given by
respectively. The aggregate surplus for those …rms and those workers that actually bene…t from the wage agreement is given by
respectively. Notice that all workers enjoy the same surplus, w s , because they all earn the same wage.
We assume that sector-level negotiators take as given the job destruction threshold R s and the number of jobs that bene…t from the agreement, n s . We make this assumption both in order to maximize comparability with the …rm-level bargaining scenario, and to focus the discussion on the e¤ects of wage compression at the sector level. 10 Nash bargaining implies maximizing the product of (7) and (8) . Given our assumption that n s is taken as given, the wage agreement equivalently solves the following problem,
for given R s . The resulting wage agreement is given by
where
is the average productivity across surviving jobs.
Equation (9) is analogous to the wage equation in the …rm-level bargaining scenario, equation (6), with average productivity replacing job-speci…c productivity. In this case, worker surplus, w s , is one half of the average match surplus, E (z j z R s ) ( ).
Job creation and job destruction
In each bargaining regime b = f; s, the job destruction threshold is determined by the zero …rm surplus condition,
Regarding job creation, we assume stochastic job matching as in Pissarides (2000, Ch. 6). Upon being matched to an unemployed worker, the …rm draws an idiosyncratic productivity for the new job from the same distribution as continuing jobs, F (x). Given such a productivity, the …rm creates the job only if the value of doing so is positive, J b (x) 0. Therefore, the productivity threshold above which jobs are created is the same as the job destruction threshold, R b . Firms post vacancies until the value of doing so equals cero. This implies the familiar free-entry condition,
where is the ‡ow vacancy cost.
Equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium in the jump variables b ; R b and the unemployment stock u b in each bargaining regime b = f; s. Consider the surplus function (1) in regime b = f . Evaluating the latter at the threshold R f , substracting the resulting expression from (1), and using the fact
The wage function (6) implies that w
Therefore, the …rm's surplus function under …rm-level bargaining can be expressed as
Similarly, combining J s (R s ) = 0 with the surplus function (1) for b = s, and the common wage in equation (9), the …rm's surplus function under sector-level bargaining can be expressed as
Evaluating (1) at the productivity threshold R b , b = f; s, using the wage equations (6) (evaluated at R f ) and (9), making use of the reduced-form surplus functions (11) and (12), and equating the resulting expressions to zero, we obtain the job destruction condition in the …rm-level bargaining regime,
and in the sector-level bargaining regime,
Notice that equations (JD f ) and (JD s ) uniquely determine the equilibrium productivity thresholds R f and R s , respectively. In other words, both job destruction conditions are ‡at lines in ( ; R)
space. We now obtain the following result.
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Lemma 1 The productivity threshold in the sector-level bargaining equilibrium is higher than in the …rm-level bargaining equilibrium:
Therefore, the job destruction condition in the sector-level bargaining scenario lies above its …rm-level bargaining counterpart in ( ; R) space. Both lines are represented in Figure 1 with the labels JD s and JD f , respectively. The intuition for Lemma 1 is straightforward. Under sectorlevel bargaining, …rms' pro…ts shrink faster with idiosyncratic productivity than they do under 11 The proof of all Lemmas are in the appendix.
…rm-level bargaining, because …rm-speci…c wages do not go down in parallel. As a result, the productivity threshold below which jobs become unpro…table is reached earlier in the case of sector-level bargaining. Consider now equation (10) in each bargaining regime b = f; s. Combining them with the surplus functions (11) and (12), we obtain the job creation condition in the …rm-level bargaining regime,
Both (JC f ) and (JC s ) are downward-sloping relationships in ( ; R) space. Notice that, evaluated at the same productivity threshold, the right-hand side of (JC s ) is higher than that of (JC f ). Since the left-hand side is increasing in , the curve (JC s ) lies above (JC f ). Both lines are represented in Figure 1 with the labels JC s and JC f , respectively. Equilibrium in the pair labor market tightness-reservation productivity in each bargaining regime b = f; s is given by the intersection point between JD b and JC b . In principle, the fact that JC f lies below JC s means that the former could intersect JD f at a point where f < s . It is however possible to obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 Labor market tightness in the sector-level bargaining equilibrium is lower than in the …rm-level bargaining equilibrium:
Therefore, JC f intersects JD f at a point where labor market tightness is higher than under sector-level bargaining, f > s , as depicted in Figure 1 . The intuition of Lemma 2 is again simple.
The fact that relative wages are not responsive to …rm-speci…c productivity shocks under sectorlevel bargaining has two opposing e¤ects on hiring incentives. On the one hand, …rms anticipate higher pro…ts from high-productivity new jobs than they would under …rm-level bargaining. On the other hand, they expect lower pro…ts from low-productivity new jobs; furthermore, new matches that draw a productivity in the range [R f ; R s ) are not even formed, unlike in the case of …rm-level bargaining, and thus generate zero pro…ts. As it turns out, the second e¤ects dominates, with the resulting discouragement of vacancy posting relative to …rm-level bargaining. Given the solution for the productivity thresholds and labor market tightness, R b ; b for b = f; s, employment and unemployment evolve according to the following laws of motion, for b = f; s. In the steady state, unemployment equals
for b = f; s. Lemma 1 implies that the total separation rate, + (1 ) F R b , is higher under sector-level bargaining. Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the job-…nding rate,
is also lower under sector-level bargaining. We thus obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Unemployment is higher in the sector-level than in the …rm-level bargaining equilibrium.
E¢ cient opting-out
Our previous sector-level bargaining setup is best interpreted as a situation in which reaching …rm-level agreements that lower worker standards relative to the sector-level agreement is either illegal or very costly/di¢ cult in practice. In this subsection we consider an alternative scenario in which every …rm-worker pair is free to costlessly opt out of the sector-level agreement and strike a new …rm-level agreement if such an arrangement is mutually bene…cial. In this scenario, which we henceforth refer to as e¢ cient opting-out, both sector-level and wage-level agreements will coexist. In particular, consider a situation in which sector-wide …rm and worker representatives strike a sectorial wage agreement like the one studied before. Let now J s (z) denote the …rm surplus from a job with idiosyncratic productivity z conditional on paying the wage agreed at the sector level, w s , where we use asterisks to denote equilibrium values in this e¢ cient opting-out scenario. Let also R s denote the reservation productivity below which …rms a¤ected by the sectorial agreement have negative surplus, implicitly de…ned by J s (R s ) = 0. Similarly, let J f (z) denote the …rm surplus function for …rms that are able to opt out of the sector-level agreement and thus pay the …rm-level wage w f (z). The corresponding productivity threshold for such …rms, R f , is implicitly
It is straightforward to show that wage agreements at each bargaining level (sector and …rm) in this scenario have the same form as when we considered each level separately, that is,
where E(z j z R s ) is the average productivity in non-opting-out …rms. Both J s (z) and J f (z)
are the sum of current pro…ts and a certain continuation value. Later we will solve explicitly for such continuation value, but as of now it su¢ ces to know that they are exactly the same for all …rms, regardless of whether they opt out today or not. Current pro…ts in opting-out and non-opting-out …rms are given respectively by
Evaluating the latter two expressions at R f and R s , respectively, using the zero surplus conditions J f (R f ) = 0 and J s (R s ) = 0, and imposing symmetry of continuation values, it follows that
Therefore, the productivity threshold for opting-out …rms is lower than for …rms that stick to the sector-level agreement, in analogy with the ordering between R f and R s previously analyzed. It is also straightforward to show that the …rm surplus functions at each bargaining level have the same form as when we considered …rm-level and sector-level bargaining separately,
Notice …nally that the pro…t functions (14) and (15) attain the same value at z = E(z j z R s ).
This, together with symmetry of continuation values, implies that
. Following a similar reasoning, it can be showed that
That is, the surplus functions of opting-out and non-opting-out …rms intersect each other at the average productivity of non-opting-out …rms, and similarly for the involved workers. Taking all these elements together, it is possible to represent graphically the surplus functions of workers and …rms in each bargaining scenario. This is done in Figure 2 , where …rm surplus functions are represented in the upper part, and worker surplus functions (gross of the outside option of becoming unemployed, U ) are represented in the lower part. 12 The key question is which …rm-worker pairs will agree to opt out of the sector-level agreement. Notice …rst that, in the productivity range z E(z j z R s ), workers would like to opt out and bargain at the …rm-level, as this would give them a higher payo¤: W f (z) > W s . However, …rms are better o¤ by sticking to the sector-level agreement, J f (z) < J s (z), and therefore will not agree to opt out. Similarly, in the range z 2 [R s ; E(z j z R s )) …rms would like to opt out of the sector-level agreement but workers are happy to stick to it, and therefore opting out will not happen. Finally, …rm-worker pairs in the range z 2 [R f ; R s ) have a mutual interest in opting out, because doing so leaves both parties better o¤ than by accepting the destruction of the job: the …rm obtains the surplus J f (z) > 0 and the worker enjoys the surplus W f (z) U > 0. It follows that …rms with productivity above R s will stick to the sector-level wage agreement, whereas …rms with productivity in-between R f and R s will reach …rm-level agreements with their employees.
This allows us to write the surplus functions as
12 Notice that Figure 2 assumes W (R f ) U . The latter can be ensured for instance by calibrating the unemployment ‡ow payo¤ appropriately. Evaluating the latter two expressions at R f and R s , respectively, and using the zero surplus conditions, we …nd two equations that jointly determine the pair of productivity thresholds R f ; R s in the e¢ cient opting-out equilibrium,
where we have also used (17) and (18) to substitute for the surplus functions J f (x) and J s (x), respectively. It is now possible to obtain the following result.
Lemma 3
The productivity threshold for opting-out …rms in the e¢ cient opting-out equilibrium is the same as the productivity threshold in the …rm-level bargaining equilibrium:
The explanation of Lemma 3 is the following. Opting out …rms know that if next period's productivity shock falls in the range [R f ; R s ) they will opt out again, whereas if the new productivity exceeds R s they will not do so. This creates two opposing e¤ects on the continuation value of opting-out …rms, relative to the fully decentralized bargaining regime. On the one hand, for future productivity levels above E(z j z R s ) they expect to obtain a higher surplus (see …gure 2). On the other hand, for future productivity levels between R s and E(z j z R s ) they expect to obtain a lower surplus. The position of average productivity in non-opting-out …rms, E(z j z R s ), is such that both e¤ects exactly cancel each other out, hence equalizing the continuation values of …rms in the …rm-level bargaining scenario and of opting-out …rms in the e¢ cient opting-out scenario. As a result, the productivity thresholds in both scenarios coincide. The job creation condition in the e¢ cient opting-out scenario is given by
where denotes labor market tightness in the e¢ cient opting-out equilibrium. It is straightforward to prove the following.
Lemma 4 Labor market tightness in the e¢ cient opting-out equilibrium is the same as in the …rm-level bargaining equilibrium:
In the e¢ cient opting-out scenario, only those jobs with productivity below the threshold for opting-out …rms, R f , are destroyed, and only new matches with productivity above the same threshold are actually formed. Therefore, the job-…nding rate is given by (1 ) 1 F R f q( ), and the total separation rate is given by + (1 ) F R f . Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that both transition rates are exactly the same as in the …rm-level bargaining scenario. This leads us to the following result.
Proposition 2 Unemployment in the e¢ cient opting-out equilibrium is the same as in the …rm-level bargaining equilibrium.
An important corollary follows from Proposition 2. In order to bring unemployment down to its level under …rm-level bargaining, it is not necessary to scrap sector-level bargaining altogether. Instead, it su¢ ces to allow …rm-worker pairs to freely and costlessly opt out of sector-level agreements should both parties …nd it mutually bene…cial.
Calibration and quantitative analysis
The previous section has obtained a number of analytical results regarding the relationship between alternative bargaining scenarios. It is nonetheless interesting to assess the magnitude of the e¤ects previously described from a quantitative point of view. With this purpose, we now perform a tentative calibration of our model economy.
Let the time period be a quarter. We calibrate our model to an average continental European labor market. Given the prevalence of collective bargaining at the sector level and higher in most continental European countries (Du Caju et al. 2008), we take the sector-level bargaining scenario as our baseline.
We set the discount rate, r, to 0.01, or 4 per cent per annum. We target a job-…nding rate,
, of 20 per cent per quarter, and a separation rate, +(1 ) F (R s ), of 2 per cent per quarter, which are roughly in line with evidence for continental European countries. 13 These transition rates imply a steady-state unemployment rate, u s , of 9.09 per cent. Based on the literature, we assume that one half of all separations are exogenous, which implies = 0:01.
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We choose a lognormal distribution for the idiosyncratic productivity shock:
, where is the standard normal cdf. Calibrating the dispersion parameter is di¢ cult, given the lack of comprehensive evidence on intra-sectoral productivity dispersion for continental European countries. Therefore, for illustrative purposes we set to 0.15, and later perform sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter. We normalize to 2 =2, such that E (z) = 1. These assumptions imply a job destruction threshold of R s = F 1 0:02 1 = 0:6979. We assume a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation for the matching function, m (u; v) = m 0 u v 1 . We set the elasticity of the matching function, , to one half. 15 We target a vacancies-to-unemployment ratio, s , of 1/4, which seems reasonable for continental European countries. The latter value, together with our target for the job-…nding rate and the fact that Equation (10), together with equation (4) and the same equation with superscripts s, imply that
, which is positive only if < =q( b ). Since our calibration pins down uniquely the sum + , and it is only through the latter sum that a¤ects both bargaining equilibria, we are free to choose any value of that satis…es < =q( s ). 16 For our baseline calibration, the upper bound for is =q( s ) = 0:2964. Equivalently, the lower bound for is ( + ) 0:2964 = 0:6889.
Our calibration implies an average worker product of
and a (common) real wage of w s = z s =2 + ( + ) =2 = 0:9944. Table 1 summarizes the baseline calibration, while the third column of Table 2 displays the equilibrium values in the baseline sector-level bargaining scenario. 15 See e.g. Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001) . 16 Lemma 2 and the fact that q 0 ( ) < 0 then automatically imply < =q( f ) in the …rm-level bargaining scenario.
Comparative statics
We now calculate the steady-state e¤ects of moving from our baseline sector-level bargaining scenario to a …rm-level bargaining scenario, that is, a situation in which every …rm bargains individually with its worker. The results are displayed in Table 2 . We can emphasize the following. First, the steady-state unemployment rate goes down by about 5 percentage points. As already emphasized in the theoretical analysis, this is the result of both an increase in the job-…nding rate and a fall in the total separation rate. In our calibrated example, the former increases from 20 per cent to about 25 per cent, whereas the latter falls from 2 to 1 per cent. In particular, the fall in the reservation productivity is such that the endogenous separation rate, F (R), drops to basically zero in the …rm-level bargaining scenario. As a result, the total separation rate converges to its exogenous component, . Finally, despite the noticeable gap between the productivity threshold in both regimes, average productivity is very similar and so is the average wage. The reason is that, under our calibration, the productivity distribution accumulates little mass between both thresholds. 
Job-…nding rate
Unemployment rate u 0.0909 0.0387
As explained before, in our baseline calibration we assumed an illustrative value for the parameter that controls the dispersion in …rm-speci…c productivity shocks, . Since the latter is likely to be an important determinant of the di¤erences between both bargaining scenarios, we now study how sensitive our results are to calibrating the sector-level bargaining scenario under di¤erent values of . In doing so, we continue to target the same transition rates and the same vacancies-unemployment ratio. 17 The results are displayed in Table 3. As the table makes clear, results under the baseline calibration ( = 0:15) are barely a¤ected as we increase or decrease the dispersion in …rm-speci…c shocks. The main e¤ect is that the drop in the productivity threshold from moving to …rm-level bargaining becomes larger as we increase . However, the fact that the productivity distribution accumulates little mass below the productivity threshold implies that even relatively large reductions in such threshold have small quantitative e¤ects on the transition rates, and therefore on unemployment. In particular, in the …rm-level bargaining regime the job…nding rate continues to be close to 25 per cent, whereas the separation rate continues to drop to 1 per cent. In our baseline model, we made the assumption that sector-level negotiators take as given the number of jobs that actually apply the sectorial wage agreement. Here, we consider an alternative setup in which both parties internalize the e¤ects of their wage claims on employment. Given last period's employment and the number of new matches, employment in the current period is determined by the reservation productivity, which is the level of productivity below which jobs become unpro…table for …rms and are thus destroyed. Given the sector-level wage agreement, it is therefore the …rms that eventually determine the level of employment. In this sense, we may interpret this situation as a right-to-manage scenario, as is typically understood in the literature. Henceforth we use the superscript r to denote the right-to-manage bargaining regime. As in the baseline model, sector-level negotiators care about the aggregate payo¤ of …rms on the one side and workers on the other. The latter are given again by equations (7) and (8), respectively, with r replacing the superscripts s. The di¤erence is that both parties now take into account how the number of jobs bene…ting from the agreement is determined. In particular, the Nash bargaining outcome is the solution to the following maximization problem,
subject to
and
Equation (21) is the law of motion of employment in the right-to-manage scenario (equation 13 for b = r). Equation (22) is the job destruction condition under right-to-manage, which is the result of evaluating the surplus function (1) for b = r at z = R, and setting the resulting expression equal to zero. Here we are using R to denote the current period's reservation productivity, and R r to denote the equilibrium productivity threshold in future periods. Since wage agreements last for one period, the current wage a¤ects the current threshold, but not future thresholds. 18 Using (21) to substitute for n r t in the objective function, and using the fact that n r t 1 + r q( r )u r t 1 is predetermined, the problem simpli…es to maximizing
subject to (22). The …rst order condition is given by
where we have used dR=dw r = 1 and the fact that in equilibrium R = R r . Henceforth we restrict our attention to equilibria in which 1 F (R r ) > f (R r ) (w r ), such that the numerator on the left-hand side of (23) is positive. We can rewrite the latter equation as
The term captures two e¤ects. On the one hand, it re ‡ects the sector union's concern for the job loss resulting from higher wage claims. In particular, a marginal increase in the wage w r and therefore in the threshold R r eliminates the surplus w r enjoyed by the measure f (R r )
of workers at the threshold. This concern acts towards reducing the union's e¤ective bargaining power, 1= (2 + ), hence pushing down the wage. On the other hand, notice that R r w r + = J r (R r ) J r . 19 Since J r (R r ) J r = J r < 0, we have that …rms at the threshold are better o¤ without an agreement. The incentive in this case works in the opposite direction: a higher wage eliminates …rms for which the surplus from reaching an agreement is negative, hence stimulating a higher wage. If the e¤ect stemming from the union's concern for job losses dominates, such that > 0, then ceteris paribus the bargained wage will be lower than in our baseline sector-level bargaining scenario. This e¤ect should then reduce the gap in unemployment rates between the …rm-level and the sector-level bargaining scenarios. In this case, we are no longer able to obtain analytical results regarding the comparison to …rm-level bargaining in terms of equilibrium unemployment. Therefore, we proceed to simulate the right-to-manage sector-level bargaining scenario under our baseline calibration. As we explained in section 4, our calibration strategy uniquely pins down the sum + , and it is only through that sum that both parameters a¤ect the …rm-level and baseline sector-level bargaining equilibria. Here, however, it does matter how that sum is distributed between both parameters, because they enter non-linearly in the wage equation (see 24 and 25). As a result, equilibrium values in the right-to-manage scenario depend on the speci…c calibration of , with then computed as
( + )
. Figure 3 plots the equilibrium values of unemployment, the transition rates and the average wage under the right-to-manage sector-level bargaining regime for di¤erent values of , together with their counterparts in the …rm-level and the baseline sector-level bargaining setups. 20 For most values of , unemployment under right-to-manage sector-level bargaining is lower than in the base- 19 The disagreement value for the …rm under right-to-manage,J r , is given by equation (4) with r replacing f superscripts. 20 As explained in section 4, the requirement that the …rm's disagreement payo¤J s is positive imposes a lower bound for , given by 0.6889. worker disagreement payoff (δ) unemployment rate right-to-manage sector-level baseline sector-level firm-level line sector-level bargaining scenario. This re ‡ects the sector union's concern for the employment e¤ects of higher wage claims in the former scenario. Such a concern manifests itself in a lower wage agreement (lower right panel), which in turn leads to a lower separation rate and a higher job-…nding rate.
More importantly, for all values of unemployment under right-to-manage sector-level bargaining is higher than in the …rm-level bargaining regime. This means that the wage restraint e¤ect discussed above is not strong enough to compensate the negative e¤ects of wage compression on unemployment. This is re ‡ected in a higher job destruction threshold, which in turn leads to a higher separation rate (upper right panel) and a lower job-…nding rate (lower left panel). Moreover, the …gure shows the unemployment gap between both bargaining scenarios increases with . Intuitively, ceteris paribus a higher payo¤ under disagreement reduces the surplus lost by the marginal workers as the wage increases, which weakens the wage restraint e¤ect under right-to-manage sector-level bargaining.
The speci…c calibration of will typically depend on certain characteristics of the labour legislation, such as strike regulations or the existence of wage ‡oors during the period in which a collective agreement has expired and a new one must be negotiated. During sectorial negotiations, typically workers are employed under the terms of the most recent collective bargaining agreement. Also, strikes during negotiations are frequently short-lived and, in case of strike, trade unions support workers with strike funds. It therefore seems natural to assume that is not too far from the wage while working. Hence, a reasonable range for the worker income loss during the negotiations could be 20-25% which, for an average wage close to 1, translates into a range of about 0.75-0.80 for . This, as shown in Figure 3 , would yield an equilibrium unemployment rate that would be about 1 to 2.4 percentage points higher than under …rm-level bargaining.
Conclusions
This paper shows that sectorial collective bargaining has implications for job creation and job destruction that lead to an increase in the unemployment rate. When …rms di¤er in productivity, the wage compression delivered by a unique sectorial wage increases job destruction and reduces job creation with respect to the situation under which there is bargaining at the …rm level and, thus, relative wages accommodate …rm-speci…c productivity shocks. Another relevant result of the analysis is that the unemployment rate associated with collective bargaining at the …rm level can be replicated under the sectorial collective bargaining regime insofar as …rms are allowed to opt out of the sectorial agreement by mutual consent of employers and workers. In our baseline sector-level bargaining setup, negotiators do not internalize the employment e¤ects of the wage agreement. When our framework is generalized to allow such employment e¤ects to be internalized, the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the disagreement payo¤ received by workers. Assuming that this payo¤ is reasonably close to the wage while working (as would be typically the case under the strike and collective bargaining regulations prevailing in most European countries), we …nd that the unemployment rate is closer to the one in our baseline sector-level bargaining setup than to the one under …rm-level bargaining.
We have obtained these results in a Mortensen-Pissarides framework with Nash wage bargaining, where fallback positions are determined by credible threats as in Hall and Milgrom (2008) . We have focused on one single characteristic of collective bargaining, namely the level of the negotiation, and we have investigated the consequences of the fact that sectorial collective bargaining yields a wage distribution across …rms which is more compressed than the productivity distribution. There are other reasons why sectorial collective bargaining may produce di¤erent unemployment outcomes than …rm-level collective bargaining. For instance, the objective functions of the wage-setters may depend on the level of negotiation. Also, strategic complementarities may arise when wage-setters in sector-level negotiations have payo¤s functions which are di¤erent from the payo¤ functions of the representative …rm and worker. One may also consider the extent to which wage-setters at di¤erent levels of negotiation internalize the externality e¤ects considered by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) . Finally, while we have focused on the relative wage rigidity implied by sectorial collective bargaining, there are other characteristics of collective bargaining that have implications for nominal wage rigidity and, thus, for the variability of wages and unemployment along the business cycle. We plan to pursue these and other issues regarding the relationship between collective bargaining and unemployment in future work.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
Let
(1 ) = (1 + r). Substracting (JD s ) from (JD f ), we obtain
(26) We …rst show that there cannot be an equilibrium with R f = R s R. Imposing the latter in (26), we have
which is a contradiction. We now show that there cannot be an equilibrium with R f > R s either.
Assume that the latter holds. We can then write
This in turn allows us to write (26) as
where in the …rst inequality we have used the fact that
. Again, equation (27) implies a contradiction. Therefore, it must be the case that R s > R f . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Using (JD f ) and (JD s ), we can express (JC f ) and (JC s ) respectively as
q(
Substracting (29) from (28), we obtain
